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Cognition-Enhancing Drugs:
Can We Say No?
Frank Pasquale1

Abstract
Normative analysis of cognition-enhancing drugs frequently weighs the liberty interests of drug users against egalitarian values.
Yet those who would refuse to engage in neuroenhancement may well find their liberty to do so limited in a society where
such drugs are widespread. To the extent that unvarnished emotional responses are world-disclosive, neurocosmetics also
threaten to foist faulty data upon all their users. This essay examines underappreciated liberty-based and epistemic rationales
for regulating cognition-enhancing drugs.
Keywords
Arms race, psychopharmaceuticals, drugs, enhancement, emotion
New pharmaceutical technology challenges extant philosophical accounts of autonomy and liberty. The classic divide
between positive and negative liberty1 will seem increasingly
outmoded as new competitive environments create dire consequences for many of those who fail to normalize behavior
and affect in line with ever-more precise neurocosmetic interventions. Paradoxes of precommitment will also develop. If a
person at one point in time commits himself to taking a drug
that both creates certain patterns of behavior and affect, and
generates a need to keep taking that drug, can the continuing
use of the drug be said to be autonomous?
We are used to distinguishing between addiction, mere
habit, and virtuous commitment by examining the psychic
state of the subject and the effect of the subject’s use of substances on her or his participation in society. Frequent cocaine
use tends to wreck a person’s career and family life. A habit
of exercising may jokingly be called an “addiction,” but is
usually admired for its contribution to health and well-being.
As large pharmaceutical firms tailor neurocosmetics to generate both feelings of well-being and efficient attention to
work, the old methods of distinguishing harmful addictions
from virtuous habits will break down. If there is a problem
with such drugs, it must be distinguished from the “drug
problem” so familiar in U.S. political discourse.
Once utilitarian analysis of the effects of drug use is set
to one side, other concerns about neurocosmetics emerge. In
previous work, I have pursued a sociological critique, focusing on the competitive pressures that render the decision to
take neurocosmetics a far from free choice.2 This essay focuses
on epistemological dimensions of advanced neurocosmetic
use, characterizing them as emotional “blinders” designed to
deny the world-disclosive dimensions of normal emotional
life. The first section focuses on current trends in psychopharmacology. The second section queries whether advanced

neurocosmetics are compatible with traditional understandings
of autonomy. The piece provisionally concludes that overemphasis on autonomy as Dennettian “elbow room” to have “done
otherwise” has obscured the epistemological foundations
of truly free choice. To the extent advanced neurocosmetics
block recognition of difficult truths or feelings, they undermine the very foundations of autonomy.

Pharmaceutical Heteronomy
What happens when pharmaceutical technology grants us
the freedom to consider ourselves heteronomous? A recent
book on health care rationing in the United States (Can We
Say No?) worries that political pressures for health spending
will ultimately bankrupt the U.S. economy. This idea of
a spending ratchet is a commonplace of the health care
finance literature. Less well covered has been a creep toward
performance-enhancing drugs. Though less of a threat to the
public till, they raise fundamental questions about individuals’
capacity for autonomous reactions to technological trends.
Consider a recent discussion in Edge, an online magazine
that asked 151 luminaries “What Will Change Everything?”
Marcel Kinsborne predicted a growing market for “neurocosmetics” that translate the benefits of cosmetic surgery to
the social world:
[D]eep brain stimulation will be used to modify personality so as to optimize professional and social opportunity,
1
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within my lifetime. Consider an arms race in affability, a
competition based not on concealing real feelings, but on
feelings engineered to be real. . . . [Or] switching a personality on and then off, when it becomes boring?
We take ourselves to be durable minds in stable
bodies. But this reassuring self-concept will turn out to
be yet another of our so human egocentric delusions.
Do we, strictly speaking, own stable identities? When
it sinks in that the continuity of our experience of the
world and our self is at the whim of an electrical current, then our fantasies of permanence will have
yielded to the reality of our fragile and ephemeral
identities.3
It is one thing to read these imaginings in the fiction of a
Houllebecq, Franzen, or Foster Wallace; it is quite another
to see them predicted by a professor of psychology at the
New School for Social Research. The arms race Kinsborne
describes is likelier to erode, rather than reveal, humanity’s
true nature.4 His complacency at this prospect reveals a
technophilic bias at the heart of Edge’s inquiry: an implicit
belief that certain technologies will inevitably change us
rather than being changed or stopped by us.
Assumptions about the plasticity of the self—and
concomitant inevitability of technology—are driving the
acceptance of new technologies of self-alteration. Helen
Fisher, a biological anthropologist and chief scientific advisor for the online dating site Chemistry.com, openly embraces
an arms race metaphor as she predicts, in the same Edge
symposium, that “ever more of us will begin to use [a] new
arsenal of weapons to manipulate ourselves and others.” In a
recent editorial in Nature titled “Towards Responsible Use
Of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs By The Healthy,”5 distinguished contributors have endorsed a “presumption that
mentally competent adults should be able to engage in cognitive enhancement using drugs.” The editorialists argue that
cognitive enhancement is here to stay: “From assembly line
workers to surgeons, many different kinds of employee may
benefit from enhancement and want access to it, yet they
may also need protection from the pressure to enhance.”6
Despite repeated failures of self-regulatory professional
standards in drug prescribing in the past,7 the Nature editorialists assume that doctors will suddenly be up to this delicate
task in the future.
As humans become more machine-like and machines
become more like humans,8 the assumption that normal emotions are something to be “fixed” or “corrected” is sure to
gain currency. At the vanguard of this approach are Patricia
and Paul Churchland, who, rather than acting out, expressing, or displaying emotions,9 appear to prefer to refer to their
supposed chemical determinants:
One afternoon recently, Paul says, he was home
making dinner when Pat burst in the door, having

come straight from a frustrating faculty meeting. She
said, “Paul, don’t speak to me, my serotonin levels
have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids,
my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it
weren’t for my endogenous opiates I’d have driven the
car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels
need lifting. Pour me a Chardonnay, and I’ll be down
in a minute.10
Fisher, Kinsborne, and the Churchlands suggest the meta
physical foundations of self-mechanization. It’s a vision of
the self as “multiple input-multiple output transducer,” which
accepts and extends a long intellectual tradition of reducing
“soul to self, self to mind, and mind to brain.”11 This last
step of understanding what the brain is as what it does is a
functionalism that begs the question Bourne used to put to
Dewey: what exactly is the point of this pragmatic deflation
of our self-understanding?12
In an increasingly market-oriented society, cost control is
often a key rationale for product success. For example, the
Wall Street Journal reports that “Nearly 30% of the total
nursing-home population is receiving antipsychotic drugs. . . .
In a practice known as ‘off label’ use of prescription drugs,
patients can get these powerful medicines whether they are
psychotic or not.”13 Drugged patients can be far cheaper to
care for than those who are fully aware of their plight. Some
businesses and schools are also pushing for more pliant
employees and students, expanding the range of what is classified as “mental illness” in order to enhance docility.14 As
Frederick Crews has observed, there is increasing pressure to
conform one’s personality to a sanguine norm.15
Many recent books are questioning the expansive trend
toward “medicalizing” emotional responses that were once
considered acceptable.16 Horwitz and Wakefield argue that
“instances of what Freud called ‘ordinary human misery’
should not be confused with real mental disorder”—but there
are many pressures toward treating them as such. As the
realm of “mental optimization” expands, more employers
will request (or demand) employees take certain drugs. For
example, someone grieved by a loss might become much
more productive if they can nip misery in the bud with the
right intervention.17

Recharacterizing Advanced
Neurocosmetics as
Generators of Faulty Data
As advanced neurocosmetics become more common in the
workplace, the complex emotional mixture of ennui, detachment, skepticism, and embers of warmth in office life limned
in a novel like Joshua Ferris’s And Then We Came to the
End18 could be flattened into the glad-handing grins of “company men.” The neurocosmetics forecast in Edge have the
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same place in the social world that marketing has in the
worlds of goods and services. Such drugs promote a shift in
their users from being an object to being a subject of marketing. As Rob Horning has suggested, “consumerism makes
the will and ability to concentrate seem a detriment to ourselves.”19 Similarly, neurocosmetics promises to relieve the
mental effort of crafting a genuinely integrated response to
events from the welter of conflicting emotions they generate,
leaving only the feeling induced by drugs.
In a world of advanced neurocosmetics, emotions lose
their world-disclosive20 potential and moral force. Rather
than guiding our choices, emotions are themselves among the
many “experiences” an individual can “consume.” The
industrial possibilities are endless; some rigorous costbenefit analyses may prove a new soma’s indispensability to
such varied crises as demographic imbalances21 and mass
unemployment.22
What kind of common moral language is necessary to a
reconsideration of neurocosmetics? Philosophers Langdon
Winner and Albert Borgmann have started answering that
question as they consider technology’s impact on the character of contemporary life.23 Borgmann notes that “simulations
of reality can lead to disastrous decisions when assumptions
or data are faulty.”24 Perhaps we should start thinking of
neurocosmetics as a faulty source of data about emotional
responses to the world around us. As Martha Nussbaum has
demonstrated in her work Upheavals of Thought, emotional
responses blend cognitive and affective reactions in a way
that is essential to responsible moral evaluation. For example, in all but the most extreme cases of trauma, a physician
who gave a patient a pill to make her forget the death of her
father a day before would rightly be viewed as deeply irresponsible. Far from being an annoyance or impediment, the
grief is essential to the identity of the griever.

Concluding Reflections:
Questions of Degree
Admittedly, the precise gradations between normal and pathological grief are difficult to draw. As Peter Kramer noted in
his book Listening to Prozac, some cultures require widows
to mourn publicly for five years after a husband’s death;
others value more rapid resilience. It is difficult to say, as a
general matter, which is the “best” response, and technology
may be a useful tool for some in oppressive societies to escape
from the worst aspects of their cultural heritage.25
Yet technological pressures to engage in certain modes of
behavior and affect, simply in order to enhance efficiency,
deserve deeper consideration. As Dr. Anjan Chatterjee, a neurologist at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital, has
observed, pharmaceutical self-control could transform autonomous humans into “automatons that are very good at
implementing things but have nothing to implement.”26

A movement from autonomy to automata-dom is not on
the agenda of any current innovators in psychopharmacology. Nevertheless, one of the great lessons of the philosophy
of technology is the slow transformation of “optional” technologies into mandatory accoutrements of daily life. The
“free choice” to take a mood-enhancing drug can quickly
morph into a de facto requirement of market competition.
For example, many students now feel that they must take
attention-enhancing drugs in order to adequately compete in
final examinations. Before celebrating drugs’ capacity to
remake ourselves, the advocates of advanced neurocosmetics need to articulate more seriously precisely what the
endpoint of their project is.
Only a few legal scholars have begun to examine the
institutional mechanisms needed to bring about such a
public articulation and examination of pharmaceutical innovation. Dov Fox has convincingly argued that “The FDA
must step outside of the cost-benefit framework and reformulate its decision making” to accommodate “a more holistic
. . . style of decision making governing biomedical enhancement activity.”27 Fox argues that such decision making
would necessitate ongoing monitoring of the use of enhancing drugs in order to ensure full understanding of their social
effects. Fox also proposes that
Congress should amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to give the FDA limited authority to regulate
the practice of medicine [because] even where all uses
of a given biomedical technology are equally safe
and effective, some such uses are appropriate, while
others are inappropriate, and can have serious social
consequences.
Such authority would enable the agency to avoid the false
dilemma of either flatly denying or approving given enhance
ment technologies.
In an essay titled “The Ends of Economics,” Dupre and
Gagnier comment on the remarkable fact that “most economists believe that the core of economics can be developed
with no assumptions at all about what an economy should
aim to provide.”28 Neurocosmeticians similarly presume
to develop ideal emotional states for individuals while
neglecting to aim to calibrate such responses to the particular
phenomenon their “patients” will encounter. The resulting
simulation of experience threatens to be as detached from
reality as the “irrationally exuberant” financial models that
led to the great financial market meltdown of 2008. Just like
market participants who assume that housing prices can only
go up, users of neurocosmetics who only seek the feeling of
happiness and calm are blinding themselves to the darker
realities of human nature and experience. Sadly, there are
many middlemen and psychiatrists manques who can profit
from such self-delusion.

Downloaded from http://bst.sagepub.com at Ebsco Electronic Journals Service (EJS) on June 2, 2010

12		
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research and/or
authorship of this article.

Notes
1. See Berlin (1969). For a prescient critique of Berlin’s dichotomy, see Taylor (1985).
2. See Pasquale (2006b, 2007). For a fuller discussion of how
choices can be both “forced and free,” see Grewal (2008).
3. The World Question Center (n.d.).
4. See Pasquale (2007).
5. See Greely et al. (2008).
6. See Greely et al. (2008).
7. See Angell (2009).
8. See Henig (2007).
9. See Kagan (2007).
10. See Portico (2007).
11. See Pasquale (2002).
12. See Bourne (1992).
13. See Lagnado (2007).
14. See O’Donnell (2007).
15. See Crews (2007).
16. See Conrad (2007), Horwitz and Wakefield (2007), Ian Jakobi
(2007), and Lane (2007).
17. Compare Jennifer Chandler (2007) on court effectively requiring injured person to undergo back surgery in order to “mitigate
damages” before allowing damages claim to go forward.
18. See Ferris (2007).
19. See Horning (2009).
20. See Kompridis (2006).
21. See Pasquale (2006a).
22. See Wong (2009) and Friedman (2007).
23. See Borgmann (1984).
24. See Edwards (2000).
25. See, for example, Sunder (2001).
26. See Gibson (2008).
27. See Fox (2005).
28. See Dupre and Gagnier (1999).
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